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Highlights 19 
• CO2 emission inventories are estimated in Kazakhstan from 2012 to 2016. 20 
• Consumption-based emissions patterns are different from production-based ones. 21 
• Construction drives most emissions embodied in trade. 22 
• Kazakhstan should develop renewable energy to achieve the “Green Economy”. 23 
Abstract 24 
The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol came to an end in 2012 and more developing 25 
countries began to participate in the new phase of world carbon emission reduction. Kazakhstan is 26 
an important energy export country and a pivot of the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI).  Despite its 27 
emissions are relatively small compared with huge emitters such as China and the US, Kazakhstan 28 
also faces great pressure in terms of CO2 emission reduction and green development.  Accurately 29 
accounting CO2 emissions in Kazakhstan from both production and consumption perspectives is the 30 
first step for further emissions control actions. This paper constructs production-based CO2 emission 31 
inventories for Kazakhstan from 2012 to 2016, and then further analyses the demand-driven 32 
emissions within the domestic market and international trade (exports and imports) using 33 
environmentally extended input-output analysis. The production-based inventory includes 43 energy 34 
products and 30 sectors to provide detailed data for CO2 emissions in Kazakhstan. The consumption-35 
based accounting results showed that certain sectors like construction drive more emissions and 36 
that the fuel consumption in different sectors varies. Furthermore, Russia and China are major 37 
consumers of Kazakhstan’s energy and associated emissions, with the construction sector playing 38 
the most important role in it. The results suggested that both technology and policy actions should 39 
be taken into account to reduce CO2 emissions and that the BRI is also a good chance for Kazakhstan 40 
to develop a “Green Economy”. 41 
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1. Introduction 44 
The threat of global climate change is one of the greatest challenges worldwide [1-3]. From the 45 
Kyoto Protocol, the world began to realize the importance of controlling greenhouse gas emissions.  46 
After the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (1997-2012), the world began to seek a 47 
more effective way to promote carbon mitigation. The Paris Agreement emphasizes the emission 48 
reduction obligations of developed and developing country groups, as being different but equally 49 
important [4]. This responsibility-sharing system indicates that emerging economies are getting 50 
involved in the global emission reduction process. Kazakhstan is the largest landlocked country in 51 
the world with plentiful natural resources and is also one of the largest oil and gas exporters in the 52 
world, especially for the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) [5]. The exploration of emission reduction in 53 
Kazakhstan is of great significance and the approval of the Paris Agreement is a milestone for this 54 
fossil energy-intensive country [6]. According to the Paris Agreement, Kazakhstan is committed to 55 
fulfilling its unconditional target of a 15% reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 31 56 
December 2030 (compared to 1990) and a conditional target of a 25% reduction in greenhouse gas 57 
emissions by 31 December 2030 (compared with 1990) [7, 8]. At the same time, Kazakhstan faces 58 
serious environmental problems [9]. To help to limit a global temperature rise well below 2 degrees 59 
with reference of pre-industrial levels by the end of this century, Kazakhstan has made great efforts 60 
toward low carbon energy structure through the use of policy and technology [10], such as the 61 
“Green Economy in Kazakhstan” project, aiming at cutting carbon emissions by 40% in 2050 from 62 
2012 levels [11, 12]. 63 
One of the serious challenges to the “Green Economy” idea comes from the energy-oriented exports 64 
in Kazakhstan. Domestic use and foreign demand together constitute about 80% of energy 65 
distribution in nearly the same share [13]. In December 2015, Kazakhstan became a full member of 66 
the World Trade Organization and in the following year, it exported energy and mineral products 67 
worth 22.58 billion dollars (68.7% of total exports) to more than 190 trade partners in the world 68 
[14]. Within that large amount of annual energy exports to the world, Kazakhstan exports three 69 
types of energy resources (coal, oil and gas) for more than 100 billion tonnes of oil equivalent every 70 
year. More than 43% of fuel exports is consumed by the Asia-Pacific region every year, and the BRI 71 
stimulates the passion to cooperate with Kazakhstan on natural resource extraction and 72 
transportation, especially for China [15, 16]. Now, China is committed to proposing a “Green Belt 73 
and Road” and achieve the goal of the Paris Agreement with partners along the New Silk Road [17]. 74 
To offer a scientific foundation for designing efficient mitigation measures in developing “Green Belt 75 
and Road”, it is necessary to further study Kazakhstan’s potential for the green transition. 76 
Accurate cognition of emission and energy accounts in Kazakhstan is the first step towards further 77 
implementing emission reduction actions. It is also the most important contribution of this study. 78 
The sketch of Kazakhstan's national emissions starts from production-based accounting. Production-79 
based accounting is based on emissions emitted from a sector or a country. United Nations 80 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol utilized this framework 81 
to determine the emission reduction responsibility of each country [2, 18]. The most widely-used 82 
methods to compile production-based CO2 emissions were proposed by the Intergovernmental 83 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), based on fossil fuels’ combustion and default factors [19]. Since the 84 
1970s, many researchers began to construct GHG emission inventories for main countries in the 85 
world, including CO2, CH4 and N2O etc., and CO2 accounted for 60% of the total GHG emissions 86 
worldwide [20-22]. Besides some international academic institutes, such as the Emission Database 87 
for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR), International Energy Agency (IEA) and the Carbon Dioxide 88 
Information Analysis Centre (CDIAC), many scholars also published their own inventories every year 89 
[21, 23-25] and improved accounting methods based on country-specific emission factors [26, 27]. 90 
Those individual datasets usually focused on a specific country so that can be an effective 91 
supplement for generalized data from international agencies. However, targeted studies for CO2 92 
accounting in developing countries were very limited. Research about carbon emission accounting in 93 
China was diversified and active, even province-level and city-level inventories were relatively 94 
complete [23-25]. In contrast, Kazakhstan’s national carbon emission accounting is virtually a blank 95 
space. The first goal of this study is to construct Kazakhstan’s national CO2 emission inventories, 96 
including detailed data on fuel products and socioeconomic sectors. 97 
Furthermore, we will keep another eye on emissions from a consumption perspective. Consumption-98 
based accounting focuses on demand-driven emissions in supply chains. Due to Kazakhstan's 99 
important status in energy exports, we will further analyse the driving forces of CO2 emissions from 100 
domestic and foreign markets using the environmentally extended input-output model. Sun et al. 101 
(2017) [28]used MRIO analysis to prove that several booming regional economies outsourced huge 102 
energy demands to foreign regions via trade. Oven et al. (2017) [29] compared energy-extracted and 103 
energy-used vectors in the consumption-based calculation and encouraged MRIO model databases 104 
for both of them. Due to the disadvantaged status of developing countries in international emission 105 
reduction from the production perspective [30], many scholars tried to construct a fairer shared 106 
emission responsibility system. Numerous studies estimated the CO2 emissions embedded in 107 
domestic and international trade at both national and local levels [30-32]. Other related studies also 108 
demonstrated the advantages of consumption-based accounting and provide a better understanding 109 
of different driving forces for carbon or other pollution emissions [33-38].  110 
Energy and environment issues in Kazakhstan entered the academic field from the early years of this 111 
century [39, 40], but most of the researches focused on case studies and empirical studies of the 112 
production-based emissions. Research about the driving forces of CO2 in Kazakhstan covers the first 113 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Karakaya et al. (2005) [41] applied a decomposition 114 
analysis to study the driving forces of fossil fuel combustion emissions in Central Asia from the 115 
collapse of Soviet Union to the beginning of 21st century (1992-2001), emphasizing that Kazakhstan 116 
improved its energy intensities to save energy and reduce carbon emissions, but emissions might 117 
increase due to the economic recovery since 2000. Regarding Kazakhstan as a part of the former 118 
Soviet Union, Brizga et al. (2013) [42] adopted the IPAT model to study the decoupling and driving 119 
forces of the former Soviet Union in different stages of economic development, when decoupling 120 
between CO2 emissions and economic growth was obvious while driving forces were various. For 121 
Kazakhstan, the economic recession led to fewer emissions and the industrialization led to more 122 
emissions. Akhmetov (2015) [43] further studied the key factors of industrial CO2 emissions in 123 
Kazakhstan for the period 1990-2011 using Index Decomposition Analysis, concluding that 124 
Kazakhstan still strongly depended on carbon-intense industries which would lead to worse 125 
environmental condition. Karatayev and Clarke (2014) [44] reviewed the energy utilization in 126 
Kazakhstan and pointed out that coal-based power generation was the main cause of the 127 
greenhouse gas emissions, so it was necessary to adopt renewable energy resources. Based on 128 
previous research, this paper tries to explore Kazakhstan's CO2 emissions in the post-Kyoto Protocol 129 
era, which refers to both production- and consumption-based analysis. Assembayeva et al. (2018) 130 
[45] focused on Kazakhstan’s electricity system and used a techno-economic model to account for 131 
related particularities; Tokbolat et al. (2018) [46] evaluated the efficiency of energy consumption of 132 
residential buildings in Astana and Kerimray, as well as the decarbonisation of the residential sector 133 
[47, 48]; Onyusheva et al. (2017) [49] researched a similar topic in the transport and energy sectors. 134 
For empirical studies, Li et al. (2018) [50] adopted the Logarithmic Mean Divisia Index (LMDI) 135 
decomposition and the Stochastic Impacts by Regression on Population, Affluence, and Technology 136 
(STIRPAT) model to study major driving factors of CO2 emissions in Kazakhstan from 1992 to 2013 137 
and Kerimray et al. (2018) [51] used LMDI to analyse energy intensity;  Xiong et al. (2015) 138 
[52]explored the development of Kazakhstan’s low-carbon economy by decoupling relationship 139 
analysis, reflecting the relationship between energy consumption and economic growth. Besides, 140 
Kazakhstan also established the domestic national Emissions Trading Schemes [53], where an 141 
extended GTAP-E model was applied to estimate emissions permits allocation [54]; carbon 142 
sequestration as a reduction tool was also discussed to help toward building low-carbon society [55]. 143 
Therefore, a gap remains in the connection between production- and consumption-based emissions. 144 
This study presents the production-based CO2 emission inventories of Kazakhstan from 2012 to 145 
2016, which are calculated using the national emission factors and sectorial level energy 146 
consumption data. This period is essential to a developing country like Kazakhstan to adapt to the 147 
post-Kyoto Protocol area. Based on the production-based emission inventories, we further estimate 148 
the carbon emissions in 2012 and 2014 from the consumption perspective. Moreover, emissions 149 
embodied in international trade are also traced, including emission flows between sectors and trade 150 
partners using the GTAP multi-regional input-output model. This framework provides a complete 151 
system to properly understand how different fuels, sectors and trade partners are implicated, with 152 
the final aim of further emission controls. 153 
 154 
2. Methods and data 155 
2.1 Production-based accounting 156 
The production-based accounting in this study presents as an annual CO2 emission inventory from 157 
2012 to 2016. The accounting scope is limited to energy consumption related CO2 by socioeconomic 158 
activities in Kazakhstan.  159 
According to the 2006 IPCC guidelines [19], the production of CO2 emissions from fossil fuel 160 
combustion can be calculated by the following equation: 161 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = ��𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= ��𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 × 𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
           (1) 162 
In Equation (1), 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  refers to the accounting results of carbon emissions, which are from the 163 
combustion of fuel i in sector j, and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is the total result of all sectors and fuel products; 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 stands 164 
for the amounts of fuels combusted by fuel i in sector j, and also defines as activity data; 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 is net 165 
calorific value of fuel i, representing the amount of heat released during the combustion; 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 means 166 
the carbon content of fossil fuel i, referring to carbon emissions per unit of fuel consumed; 𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 is the 167 
oxygenation efficiency during combustion [23-26]. In this study, we adopt 𝑖𝑖 ∈ [1, 43] and 𝑗𝑗 ∈ [1, 30] 168 
from official statistical data (see details in Section 2.3), suggesting the amounts of related energy 169 
products and socioeconomic sectors. 170 
Considering the data diversity and sample size, we calculate the emissions based on physical fuel 171 
consumption. The analysis adopts 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 provided by Fuel and energy balance of the Republic of 172 
Kazakhstan (FEB of Kazakhstan) and default𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 and 𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  value in IPCC guidelines, the factors are 173 
listed in Table 1. 174 
As a result, the final emission inventory includes CO2 emissions by fossil fuel combustion of 43 175 
energy products and 30 socioeconomic sectors. 176 
2.2 Consumption-based accounting: IO and MRIO analysis 177 
In contrast to production-based emissions, consumption-based accounting allocates the emissions 178 
along the production supply chain to meet the final demands, which specifically accounts the 179 
emissions driven by the final consumer. Consumption-based emissions in Kazakhstan include 180 
demand-driven emissions in 57 socioeconomic sectors embodied in local commodities that are 181 
consumed locally and emissions embodied in international imports that are produced in other 182 
countries. Environmentally Extended Input-output Analysis (EEIO) is widely used in trailing economic 183 
drivers of regional and global CO2 emissions accounting [30-32]. EEIO is generated based on the 184 
classic IO model and is built upon intersectional flows in intermediate demand and final demand. 185 
The general structure of classic IO model is 186 
𝑋𝑋 = 𝑍𝑍 + 𝑌𝑌 = 𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋 + 𝑌𝑌       (1) 187 
where 𝑋𝑋 is the total output of each sector;  𝑍𝑍, the direct requirement matrix, indicates the direct 188 
input for production processes;  𝑌𝑌 is the final demand matrix; and 𝐴𝐴 is defined as 𝐴𝐴 = 𝑍𝑍/𝑋𝑋, referring 189 
to direct technique coefficient and the contribution of each element in the direct requirement 190 
matrix makes towards total output. To further rewrite the equation (1) that 𝑋𝑋 is a function of 𝑌𝑌, we 191 
have: 192 
𝑋𝑋 = 𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋 + 𝑌𝑌 = (𝐼𝐼 − 𝐴𝐴)−1𝑌𝑌 = 𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌     (2) 193 
where 𝐼𝐼 is the identity matrix and 𝐿𝐿 = (𝐼𝐼 − 𝐴𝐴)−1 is the Leontief inverse matrix. Then the 194 
environmental account should be incorporated into the model: 195 
𝑒𝑒 = 𝑓𝑓𝑋𝑋−1      (3) 196 
𝑋𝑋 = 𝑒𝑒^𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌^   (4) 197 
where 𝑓𝑓 is production-based emissions in Kazakhstan for each sector, and 𝑒𝑒 refers to the emission 198 
intensity, which is the emissions per unit of output; 𝑒𝑒^ and 𝑌𝑌^ represent the diagonal matrix with 199 
elements of 𝑒𝑒 and 𝑌𝑌 on its main diagonal, so we finally get 𝐶𝐶, which is the matrix of emission 200 
associated with n sectors. This model can be extended to analysis emission embodied in 201 
international trade as well, in which the meaning of each symbol is extended to the corresponding 202 
range in a multi-regional case.  203 
2.3 Data source 204 
2.3.1 Energy activity data 205 
Accounting for Kazakhstan’s carbon emission inventories is based FEB of Kazakhstan 2012-2016, 206 
compiled by Ministry of National Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan Committee on statistics 207 
[13]. These official statistical yearbook series contain 43 fuel products and 14-17 socioeconomic 208 
sectors in energy balance tables at the national level.  Besides the indicators above, each FEB of 209 
Kazakhstan includes other energy indicators, such as the number of heat sources and price index of 210 
enterprises manufacturing industrial products for energy resources, which can be used in further 211 
exploration about energy consumption in Kazakhstan. 212 
2.3.2 IO tables 213 
Input-output tables are collected from the GTAP database and provides the multi-regional input-214 
output tables, which includes 141 countries or regions and 57 sectors in 2011 and 2014 separately 215 
[56]. As we were unable to access to Kazakhstan’s national input-output tables, we use Kazakhstan’s 216 
part in GTAP 2011 and 2014 instead. Also, due to the lack of input-output table in 2012, when 217 
calculating consumption-based emission in 2012 we take the input-output table from 2011 to 218 
approximate production relations in 2012. 219 
2.3.3 Data matching process 220 
Fuel or energy products and socioeconomic sectors vary across different indicators in FEB of 221 
Kazakhstan, 2006 IPCC guidelines and the GTAP database, so it is necessary to match data to uniform 222 
standards before accounting. 223 
According to the method described in 2.1, a series of CO2 emission factors from IPCC guidelines are 224 
adopted for accounting sectoral approach emissions, meaning all energy products are supposed to 225 
be the same as definitions of fuel types in 2006 IPCC guidelines. We match 43 energy products to 226 
IPCC classification according to definitions in guidelines. Some different energy products correspond 227 
to the same energy type in IPCC, and our detailed matching process is contained in Table S1 in 228 
Supporting Information. 229 
We further adjust and standardize socioeconomic sectors according to the National Accounts of the 230 
Republic of Kazakhstan [57], so we have 30 socioeconomic sectors to make Kazakhstan’s emission 231 
inventories. Moreover, to match the emission inventories with the GTAP database, the 30 sectors 232 
are further divided into 57 sectors based on each sector’s output share for inventories in 2012 and 233 
2014 (Table S2 in Supporting Information). As output share is not the same as emission share, we 234 
adjust some sectors' data according to the GTAP environmental account (eg. water supply). It is also 235 
why we do not divide every year’s inventory into 57 sectors in the annual emission inventory. 236 
3. Results and discussion 237 
3.1 Basic energy and socio-economic status in Kazakhstan  238 
Kazakhstan has plentiful natural resources, especially fossil fuel resources. Its national coal 239 
reservations are more than 176.7 billion tons and account for 4% of the world's total reservations, 240 
ranking it eighth in the world. For oil reservations, 4.8-5.9 billion tons of proven reserves on land and 241 
8 billion tons in the Caspian Sea area (regions belonging to Kazakhstan) rank Kazakhstan seventh in 242 
the world and second in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Accompanied by such rich 243 
oil deposits, the coverable amounts of natural gas in Kazakhstan are beyond 3 trillion cubic meters.  244 
The energy reservations directly decide the energy supply and demand structure, and further affect 245 
emissions. Fossil fuel combustion is the major source of CO2 emissions in Kazakhstan [19], and the 246 
structure of fuel production and consumption reflects the activity level data for emissions. According 247 
to Kazakhstan’s official statistics, from 2012 to 2016, domestic energy supply maintains a stable level 248 
(286.645-301.112 106 tons conventional fuel) and meets most of the demand for domestic and 249 
exports (75.95%-87.67%), while imports and other intakes only account for a small share of the total 250 
(3.24%-5.37%). In total primary energy supply, the percentage of coal is 40% while oil and gas 251 
separately accounts for nearly 30%, but in total final consumption, coal surpasses the other two 252 
primary energy items by more than 20%[13]. From this perspective, the energy consumption 253 
structure of Kazakhstan is coal-dominated, and countries with similar energy structure usually face 254 
serious emission reduction tasks.     255 
Referring to the time trend of Kazakhstan's energy consumption, economic development in the 256 
same period needs to be considered. As Fig. 1 shows, the last five-year-period (2012-2016) is full of 257 
ups and downs for Kazakhstan. During 2012-2013, the global economy grows slowly and the external 258 
conditions are unfavourable for economic development in Kazakhstan. However, the domestic 259 
demand growth, together with high investment incentives, rapid service growth, and the relatively 260 
high growth rate of agriculture, machinery manufacturing and construction, leads to substantial 261 
development of Kazakhstan economy. Since 2014, the global economy has been unstable which has 262 
meant that the economic growth of Kazakhstan’s main trading partners - such as China and Russia - 263 
has slowed down, which meant the external market demand decreased more than for 2012 and 264 
2013. The decreasing trend in total exports and energy exports continued after 2014. Moreover, 265 
Kazakhstan’s economy has also been strongly affected by Western sanctions against Russia and the 266 
sharp drop in oil prices. In this circumstance, Kazakhstan cannot avoid seeing its economy fading. 267 
Compared to GDP [58], energy consumption displays a similar time trend, as Fig. 1 displays. The 268 
consumption reaches to a peak in 2015 from 2012, and quickly drops to an even lower level than in 269 
2014. Energy intensity, referring to the energy consumption rate related to GDP, clearly reflects the 270 
relationship between energy consumption and economic status. From 2012-2014, both energy 271 
consumption and GDP experience initial growing and followed by decline, but GDP falls much more 272 
and energy consumption intensity shows an increasing trend in the years of the economic 273 
slowdown. From the decoupling analysis perspective, there is also a weak decoupling and weak 274 
negative decoupling relationship between energy consumption and GDP.  275 
 276 
Fig. 1. Main economic and consumption indicators of Kazakhstan. The data were obtained from Fuel and 277 
energy balance of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2012-2016 and World Development Indicators. GDP, Energy 278 
Exports and Total Exports are measured by million US dollars and Domestic energy consumption and Physical 279 
Energy Exports are measured by thousands of tons of conventional fuel. 280 
3.2 Kazakhstan CO2 emission accounts 2012-2016 281 
Fig. 2 shows the main energy and sector structure in CO2 emissions during 2012-2016. According to 282 
the trend displayed in Fig.2, we adopted the Mann-Kendall test to explore the possible decreasing 283 
trend in CO2 emissions[59, 60]. However, the test result is p-value = 0.242, which means it fails to 284 
conclude any significant trend in the research period (α = 0.05). This indicates the fluctuated feature 285 
of Kazakhstan's emissions at the beginning of the post-Kyoto Protocol period. With more data to 286 
collect, we will conduct the test again in future research.    287 
Listed energy products are responsible for more than 90% of the total emissions. Among these major 288 
fossil fuel sources, a series of coal-related energy contributes to CO2 emissions far more than others, 289 
and Stone coal for energy is responsible for nearly 70% of coal emissions on average. However, 290 
according to official Kazakhstan statistics, the share of coal consumption in total natural resources is 291 
only about 35%-45% in recent years; gas-related fuel is preceded only to coal; Associated petroleum 292 
gas and Natural gas induce nearly 6000 Kt CO2 during the 2012-2014 period; at the same time, Gasoil 293 
is the main source of oil-induced emission, accounting for about 90% of oil-related products. 294 
 295 
Fig. 2. Energy and sector structure of CO2 emissions in Kazakhstan from 2012 to 2016.  296 
A counterintuitive fact in this is that in 2014, GDP goes down while CO2 emissions still keep 297 
increasing. Based on this fact, we assume that some important economic drivers recede so that 298 
related emissions fall as well, but other sectors emit more in 2014. According to the CO2 emission 299 
inventory and sectoral category standards from Shan, et al. (2018) [23], we further analysed the 300 
sector structure of emission. In all, 30 socioeconomic sectors in emission inventory are aggregated 301 
to four kinds of sectors based on their socioeconomic features in Table S3 in Supporting Information: 302 
farming sector, industry sectors, construction and service sectors. Industry sectors are further 303 
divided into energy production, heavy manufacturing, light manufacturing and other industries. As 304 
Fig. 2 shows, energy production accounts for more than 70% of total emissions, and top emitters 305 
from other industries or sectors are presented as well.  306 
Energy production industries and main heavy industries emit more while emission of non-specified 307 
industry drops sharply in 2014. Non-specified industry always plays a significant role in industrial 308 
emissions, except in 2014, the inflexion point of Kazakhstan's economy. In 2015-2016, energy 309 
production industries emit 24% less than the peak value in 2014, when heavy industry and non-310 
specified industry become more emission-intensive. This result explains the five-year trend of CO2 311 
emission and economic status. 312 
As an energy-driven emerging economy, energy production and consumption are and will be the 313 
main motivation of economic development. High-carbon developing mode usually promotes the 314 
emerging economy’s development immediately at the beginning phases, but the low-carbon 315 
economic transformation will be a compulsory topic in the long run. 316 
To better identify the CO2 emission status of Kazakhstan, we further compare the emission 317 
intensities (ton/1000 USD GDP) of 10 similar developing countries with Kazakhstan’s. Among them, 318 
Ukraine has the most similar economic structure and volume with Kazakhstan, besides they are both 319 
former Soviet Union countries; Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are central Asian 320 
countries as Kazakhstan, which are close in economic structures but far behind Kazakhstan in 321 
economic volumes; Algeria, Iraq, Peru, Qatar and Romania are in a nearby ranking in GDP with 322 
Kazakhstan but their economic structures vary. The results are shown in Fig.3. 323 
 324 
Fig. 3. Emission intensities in Kazakhstan and similar economies from 2012 to 2016 (ton/1000 USD). The data 325 
of Kazakhstan are based on this research and others are from EDGARv4.3.2 database[61]. 326 
Fig.3 indicates that compared to economic volumes, the economic structures affect emission 327 
intensities more. If we take 0.5 as the baseline to distinguish the emission intensity level, the 11 328 
countries above can be divided into two groups: Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 329 
are in the high-intensity group, and others are in the low-intensity group. The high-intensity group 330 
has a downward trend but still keeps in the high-intensity level (above the baseline). Countries in the 331 
high-intensity group all have very similar industrial structures, which are dominated by the energy 332 
industry. In that group, Kazakhstan’s emission intensity ranks 3rd or 4th place from 2012 to 2016, 333 
which means the economy is relatively green and clean in energy-oriented countries. But compared 334 
to other similar economies, especially emerging economies which are not dependent on energy 335 
production, Kazakhstan seems to be much more carbon intense. In the future development even 336 
international competition, the feature of the high carbon intensity of Kazakhstan's economy may 337 
cause deeper problems in the long run.            338 
3.3 Comparison of the consumption-based emissions in Kazakhstan of 2012 and 2014. 339 
Fig. 4 compares sector contribution changes from the consumption perspective in total and different 340 
fuel products in 2012 and 2014. To make results clearer, 14 agriculture base sectors in the GTAP are 341 
aggregated to the “Agriculture” sector. Consumption-based emissions reflect emissions included in 342 
all sectors in the economy, which are induced by the demand of a certain sector. The result may 343 
differ from production-based emissions for complicated economic activities, and this difference also 344 
tells us the “actual” emitters in the national economy. 345 
For total emissions, three top production-based emitters are turning to decrease in consumption-346 
based emissions. Electricity supply (ELY), gas production (GAS) and land transport (OTP) emit more 347 
than 151.47Mt CO2, accounting for 42, 19, and 6% of total fuel combustion emissions in the 348 
production process respectively, which mainly come from coal, oil and gas combustion. This 349 
distribution corresponds to Kazakhstan’s energy-leading economic structure. However, from the 350 
perspective of consumption, those three sectors contribute only 39.49Mt CO2, accounting for 11, 5 351 
and 1% of total emissions. The sharp decline of electricity supply and gas production may be 352 
attributed to other sectors’ strong reliability of energy and convenient land transportation, 353 
especially in some light manufacturing and service sectors. 354 
On the contrary, due to the longer supply chain involving high-carbon industries(oil, gas, electricity 355 
supply and land transport), some sectors which are not main emitters in production contribute 356 
multiple times the level of emissions in consumption. Oil production (OIL), public administration 357 
(OSG) and construction (CNS) together emit 11.71Mt CO2, accounting for 5% of emissions from the 358 
perspective of production, but separately emit 36.43Mt, 20.65Mt and 17.11Mt CO2 from the 359 
perspective of consumption, accounting for more than 33% of the total emissions. Besides, many 360 
industry sectors and service sectors contribute more emissions from the perspective of 361 
consumption, such as other metals (NMF), trade (TRD), petroleum and coal products (P_C), and 362 
chemical, rubber and plastic products (CRP). For agriculture, energy and heavy industry input lead to 363 
more consumption-based emission; and for ferrous metals (I_S) and other manufactures (OMF), the 364 
main demands go to electricity and themselves, so this sector plays an important role in both the 365 
production and consumption scenario. 366 
For emissions from different fuels, coal displays a similar pattern as total emissions for it is the main 367 
fuel resource of economic activities, while demands from the food industry (CMT, OMT and MIL) 368 
also induce considerable consumption-based emissions. Nearly 70% of oil production-based 369 
emissions go to land transport, oil production and other manufactures and oil production together 370 
with construction become the main drivers of consumption-based emissions. Gas emission 371 
distribution seems to be much simpler in that gas production and electricity supply account for more 372 
than 90% of production-based emissions, while in consumption-based emissions, demands for oil 373 
and gas result in 50% of emission and demands for heavy manufacturing and many service sectors 374 
share the other 50%.  375 
 376 
Fig. 4. Comparison of the consumption-based emissions in Kazakhstan of 2012 and 2014. The emissions of 377 
2012 were displayed above the horizontal axis and 2014 below.  378 
This total emissions trend is similar to emissions in 2012 when energy production and manufacturing 379 
dominated the emissions, but some changes have happened since. Taking the main emission 380 
contributors in 2011 as the baseline and comparing with emissions from the same sectors in 2014, it 381 
is obvious that the main distribution remains the same while some sectors change their rankings in 382 
emission contribution. Other manufacturing (OMF), other business services (OBS) and coal (COA) 383 
tend to emit less from consumption-based perspective. On the contrary, consumption-based 384 
emissions concerning other minerals (OMN), machinery and other equipment (OME) and other food 385 
products (OFD) prompt more emissions than before. If those sectors are clustered to a more 386 
aggregated level, results based on detailed fuel categories extend our analysis. 387 
As analysed in section 3.2, compared to 2012, the energy production industry contributes more 388 
emissions from the perspective of production. From the perspective of consumption, only demands 389 
for gas induce more emissions than 2012, while emissions caused by both coal and oil demands in 390 
the energy production sector decline, which is opposite to the total trend. Another important 391 
emission reduction happens in other manufacturing (OMF), which has already been discussed in 392 
section 3.1. From the following figure (Fig. 5), we can see that the consumption-based emissions in 393 
other manufacturing have fallen by a fair amount, while the main source refers to coal emissions. As 394 
to demand-driven view, the huge reduction of demand from other manufacturing itself leads to this 395 
result. Other sectors keep a pretty stable demand for other manufacturing and even some heavy 396 
industry sectors induce more emissions. 397 
Besides energy production and other industries, different fuels perform differently in emissions of 398 
various sectors. From the perspective of consumption, coal-induced emissions distribution in 2014 is 399 
consistent with 2012 except in other manufacturing; oil-induced emissions caused more by demand 400 
for service sectors, light manufacturing and farming sectors in 2014, and demand for construction is 401 
always the main driver of emissions; gas emissions are mainly led by demands for energy 402 
production, heavy manufacturing and service. The time trend is quite clear as is its distribution. 403 
3.4 Exported and imported emission flows embodied in trade 404 
Emissions embodied in exports and imports are driven by different sectors and countries as Fig. 5 405 
shows. For exports, Kazakhstan produces more CO2 emissions to meet foreign markets’ needs in 406 
construction, various kinds of industrial sectors and service sectors concerning public service, 407 
transport and trade. Among those drivers, construction (CNS) is the dominant sector that drives 408 
approximately 16% of total emissions embodied in exports. From 2011 to 2014, Kazakhstan 409 
produces less CO2 emissions (7.62%) to export. Besides construction, this fall mainly comes from 410 
industrial sectors, such as other manufacturing (OMF) and other machinery and equipment (OME), 411 
while most of the service sector drivers contribute more, except public service (OSG) and air 412 
transport (ATP). For imports, the embodied emissions are generally associated with construction 413 
(CNS), wearing apparel (WAP), chemical, rubber and plastic products (CRP), motor vehicles and parts 414 
(MVH), other machinery and equipment (OME) and public service (OSG).  Compared to 2011, total 415 
emissions embodied in imports increase significantly (47.17%), and this can be attributed mainly to 416 
emerging demands for CRP in domestic markets. Demands for MVH, services and food products also 417 
contribute to the growth. Construction is the most important sector in both export and imports. In 418 
the recession of emissions embodied in exports from 2011 to 2014, the amount of emissions related 419 
to construction also falls but the proportion rises, which means the driving force from construction is 420 
relatively stable; at the same time, during the extending process of emissions embodied in imports, 421 
emissions related to construction also experiences a considerable increase in both amount 422 
(2724.03Kt to 3771.49Kt) and proportion (14.10% to 19.52%). On the one hand, construction itself is 423 
a sector which includes long value chains and has support from high carbon industries; on the other 424 
hand, construction is an essential force to promote economic development, especially for an 425 
emerging economy.  426 
 427 
Fig. 5. Emissions embodied in trade for Kazakhstan for 2011 and 2014.  428 
Contributions from different trade partners vary sharply from 2011 to 2014. Fig. 5 (a) and (b) display 429 
the change in both exports and imports. In 2011, main overseas consumers of Kazakhstan’s CO2 430 
emissions were China (10%), USA (7%), EU (28%) and CIS countries (except Russia) (6%). For EU 431 
countries, Austria, France, Germany Italy and Romania were the main consumers, and emissions 432 
embodied in exports to Switzerland are even more than any single country in the EU. For CIS 433 
countries, emissions are mostly produced in exports to Ukraine and the rest of the former Soviet 434 
Union (XSU). Japan, Israel and Turkey also take significant account in emissions related to exports. 435 
Russia, for the similar industry structure and trade structure, accounts for only 1% of Kazakhstan’s 436 
emissions embodied in exports. After Russian military intervention in Ukraine in March 2014, 437 
western countries took strict economic sanctions against Russia [62, 63], which saw Kazakhstan 438 
become a key transition point between Russia and the western world [64, 65]. More energy and 439 
industrial products were re-exported via Kazakhstan and the rapid increase of emissions embodied 440 
in exports to Russia (14%) and the EU (31%) reflects that. Sanctions to Russia also stimulated re-441 
imports for Kazakhstan for the same reason, thus we can see a larger increase for emissions 442 
embodied in imports from Russia (7% to 39%), which exceed other major trade partners (China, 443 
Ukraine and the rest of the former Soviet Union) by a significant margin.  444 
Astana, the capital Kazakhstan, is the birthplace of China's "One Belt One Road" initiative, and China 445 
also regards Kazakhstan as its most essential trade partner in Central Asia. As to the perspective of 446 
exports, emissions induced by China are mainly constituted by investment demand, and this trend 447 
continues from 2011 to 2014 (from 61% to 65%). This is different from the constitution of final 448 
demands in total emissions embodied in exports, where household demand accounts for 58%. This 449 
trend in economic sectors reflects that emissions are driven by construction (CNS) and other 450 
machinery and equipment (OME) and is far more than other sectors, even in 2014 when related 451 
total emissions dropped a lot. For imports, the composition of final demands is consistent with the 452 
overall trend that household demand is the dominant one. Related reflection in sectors is that 453 
domestic demand of the light industry, such as wearing apparel (WAP) and leather products (LEA), 454 
lead the driving force of emissions embodied in imports. During 2011 to 2014, China's emissions 455 
induced by Kazakhstan's demands of trade (TRD) keep stable; demands of leather products (LEA), 456 
chemical, rubber and plastic products (CRP) and dairy products (MIL) significantly increase; while 457 
other sectors decrease, especially petroleum and coal products (P_C). Compared to the 458 
concentrated trend of industries in exports, sector distribution in imports is dispersed. For example, 459 
in 2014, the top three sectors in emissions embodied in exports account for 57.04% of total 460 
emissions, but the top three sectors in emissions embodied in imports account for only 33.77% of 461 
total emissions. This means that in the bilateral trade between China and Kazakhstan, the variety 462 
and complexity of each country’s trade dependency is different. If Kazakhstan wants to reduce CO2 463 
emissions embodied in exports to China, it is more efficient to focus on the supply of certain 464 
industries. 465 
4. Main findings and policy recommendations 466 
4.1 Main findings 467 
In this paper, we characterize a full picture of Kazakhstan’s CO2 emissions from both production- and 468 
consumption-based perspectives in the post-Kyoto Protocol era. First, we make Kazakhstan’s CO2 469 
emission inventories from 2012 to 2016, which refers to 43 energy products and 30 socioeconomic 470 
sectors. Then we measure the demand-driven emissions of each economic sector using 471 
Environmentally Extended Input-output Analysis based on data in 2012 and 2014 and compare the 472 
results with production-based results. Furthermore, we trace the final demand drivers and original 473 
emitters of the exported and imported emissions through international supply chains in the same 474 
period.  475 
The results indicate that from the production perspective, even the supply of coals depends on 476 
imports more than before, coal-related fuels are the main contributors to emissions. 477 
Correspondingly, energy production and heavy manufacturing are major emitters. Due to the 478 
western sanctions towards Russia, the emission intensities in related industries vary in 2014, as 479 
same as Kazakhstan’s economy. From the consumption perspective, oil production, public 480 
administration and construction are top contributors, and other metals, trade and petroleum and 481 
coal products drive more emissions than in the production perspective. Meanwhile, different fuels 482 
play different roles: more emissions produced by energy sectors flow to industry and service sectors 483 
in coal and gas, while more emissions produced by service sectors flow to energy sectors in oil.  484 
In the further analysis of emissions embodied in trade, construction drives most emissions in exports 485 
and consumes most emissions in imports at the same time. Besides, major drivers for emissions 486 
embodied in exports are petroleum and coal products, public service and machinery. And the main 487 
consumers of emissions embodied in the imports are wearing apparel, chemicals, and motor 488 
vehicles. For trade partners, Russia and China are important consumers and producers. Kazakhstan 489 
acts as a transition point for Russia and the western world after the sanctions and a considerable 490 
amount of emissions take place in the re-export process. Chinese active demands for investment in 491 
few sectors drive more than half of the emissions embodied in exports, while the import side is 492 
dominated by household and distribute to more sectors.  493 
4.2 Policy recommendations 494 
Based on the detailed analysis of Kazakhstan’s emission features, the main causes of CO2 emissions 495 
in Kazakhstan are high-coal energy production and industries, including domestic consumption and 496 
international trade. Thus, the most essential policy is developing a mature system of renewable 497 
energy to replace coal gradually. Kazakhstan began to develop renewable energy from the beginning 498 
of this century, but the coal oriented energy production has not changed yet. To achieve a low 499 
carbon transition, Kazakhstan needs a comprehensive strategy to encourage renewable energy 500 
development: 501 
First of all, the government should increase the financial supports for the promotion of renewable 502 
energy. The potential and existed renewable energy in Kazakhstan is abundant, but the promotion is 503 
blocked by higher economic costs. Kazakhstan is still an emerging economy, so if cleaner means 504 
more expensive, the public will tend to choose cheaper energy even it leads to more carbon 505 
emissions. It is necessary for the government to take fiscal measures to guide the public adopting 506 
cleaner energy, such as tax incentives, financial subsidies, and government procurements.  507 
Moreover, creating new economic growth chances for low carbon transition and renewable energy. 508 
As the most essential and biggest emerging economy in Central Asia, high-carbon industries are 509 
often the key drivers of the economy. The balance between emission reduction and economy 510 
development should be considered seriously. Besides the attempt to balance in the residential 511 
sector [66]. It will be more efficient if Kazakhstan can explore new economic growth chances from 512 
renewable energy applications, including more job opportunities, new industries and new supply 513 
chains. The promotion of renewable energy should not only be a burden but one of the important 514 
economic engines for this country in the long term. 515 
Finally, more international cooperation in the green economy and renewable energy. The “Belt and 516 
Road Initiative” is an ideal opportunity for Kazakhstan to cooperate with China and other economies 517 
to solve the common development problems. Take China as an example, the northwest regions of 518 
China have a similar geographical environment with Kazakhstan, thus the experience of carbon 519 
mitigation and renewable energy development may enlighten Kazakhstan. Besides, Kazakhstan has 520 
been the energy supplier for Asia and Europe for a long time, which increases local carbon 521 
emissions. Corresponding to Kazakhstan’s “Bright Road Initiative”, China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” 522 
also aims to strengthen Kazakhstan as a logistics pivot connecting Europe and Asia, instead of a 523 
simple energy producer. 524 
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